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17 OCT 23 AM 10:57  
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
CLEVELAND

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

SECUNDA ANN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CUYAHOGA COUNTY COURT OF COMMON  
PLEAS,

Defendant.

) CASE NO. 1:17 CV 2093  
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) JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER  
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MEMORANDUM OF OPINION  
AND ORDER

On October 5, 2017, Plaintiff *pro se* Secunda Ann Williams filed this *in forma pauperis* action against Defendant Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. The Complaint is not easily understandable, but appears to allege Plaintiff's mother died as a result of a dog bite, and that Plaintiff is dissatisfied with a decision of the Defendant court.

Although *pro se* pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.<sup>1</sup> *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> An *in forma pauperis* claim may be dismissed *sua sponte*, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. *Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Smith*, 507 F.3d 910, 915 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007); *Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co.*, 915 F.2d 260, 261 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990); *Harris v. Johnson*, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986).

Cir. 2010)


A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” *Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009). A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. *Id.*

Principles requiring generous construction of *pro se* pleadings are not without limits. *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. *See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.*, 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. *Beaudette*, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would “require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a *pro se* plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” *Id.*

Even construing the Complaint liberally in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, *Brand v. Motley*, 526 F.3d 921, 924 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2008), it does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting she might have a valid federal claim. *See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.*, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996)(court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief). This action is therefore

dismissed under section 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



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DAN AARON POLSTER  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE